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Abstract
This Note argues that the Restatement Third provisions fail to provide a precise outline of
jurisdictional boundaries as generally accepted by the international community. Part I analyzes
the jurisdictional provisions in the Restatement Second and contrasts them with corresponding
sections in the Restatement Third. Part II examines issues that have arisen under the Restatement
Second jurisdictional scheme. Part III examines those same issues in light of the Restatement Third
modifications. This Note concludes that the Restatement Third provisions limiting extraterritorial
prescriptions function as abstention principles developed by the U.S. judiciary, and that in order
to determine the outermost limits of U.S. jurisdiction under international law, the executive and
legislative branches should be guided by principles commonly understood by a consensus of the
international community as acceptable extraterritorial prescriptions.

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE
THIRD RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
In the typical classroom hypothetical, a criminal fires a
gun across an international border, wounding a victim on the
other side.' Which state has the greater right to bring the
criminal to justice? The criminal's home state might well argue it has the more powerful right to prescribe and enforce
laws governing the behavior of those within its territory. The
victim's state, however, might claim a greater interest in enacting and enforcing laws designed to protect those within its
borders. 2 Additionally, both states may have strong public
policies to be considered with regard to the actions they may
choose to take.' This basic hypothetical illustrates the difficulty of setting down guidelines to determine when a state may
prescribe laws governing conduct beyond its borders and
under what circumstances that state ought to be allowed to disregard the territorial sovereignty of another in order to implement its own national policies.
This is the task with which the American Law Institute (the
"ALI") 4 was confronted when, in 1979, it undertook to revise
and update the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (the "Restatement Second"). 5 While
the Restatement Second merely purported to state and clarify
existing law,' its successor, Restatement of the Law Third, Re1. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 18 illustration 2 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
2. See infra textaccompanying notes 33-34.
3. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
4. The American Law Institute (the "ALI") is a voluntary private association
made up ofjudges, lawyers, and law professors. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1,
at IX.
5. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1. A restatement is a volume that "tell[s]
what the law in a general area is, how it is changing, and what direction the authors
think this change should take." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979).
Although restatements are not binding as law, they have been accorded such high
respect by the courts that as of April 1, 1986, over 94,000 citations to them have been
recorded. Citations to the Restatement of the Law and ALI Codifications up to April 1, 1986,

63 A.L.I. PROC. 470-71 (1986).
6. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, at XI.
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statement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(the "Restatement Third"),7 contains provisions that appear to
deviate from traditionally acknowledged principles of international law, particularly section 401 on categories of jurisdiction, section 402 on bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, and section 403 on limitations to prescriptive jurisdiction.
This Note argues that the Restatement Third provisions
fail to provide a precise outline of jurisdictional boundaries as
generally accepted by the international community. Part I anaThe Foreign Relations Law of the United States includes portions of international law, as that term is used to describe the legal aspects of relations
between nations, and that part of the domestic law of the United States that
is involved in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States, including constitutional law and some portions of conflict of laws.
Id. This particular restatement, adopted in 1962 and published three years later,
differed from previous restatements adopted by the ALI:
The inclusion of the international legal aspects of foreign relations law in
the Restatement of this Subject presents certain problems, particularly those
of source material, that have not been present in the preparation of other
Restatements. This results in large part from differences in the sources of
international law and domestic law. In general, rules of domestic law tend
to be based upon authoritative declarations by legislatures and courts.
While many of the rules of international law have been authoritatively declared, as by a "law-making" international agreement or by an international
tribunal, others are based primarily upon opinions held by experts or positions taken by governments in diplomatic correspondence with other governments. In these latter situations the positions or outlooks of particular
states, including the United States, should not be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support.
Id. at XI-XII. In recognition of the diversity of opinions, policies, and practices that
might well lay claim to being termed "international law," the ALI acknowledged that
the work "[represented] the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules
that an international tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in
accordance with international law." Id. at XII. The Restatement Second was intended as neither an official statement of United States policy, nor a pragmatic submission of improvements in existing international law. Its approach was merely to
"state and clarify existing law, international and domestic ...." Id. at XI.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
(1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]. The project of preparing the Restatement
Third was commenced in 1979 and continued over the course of seven years, tentative drafts being issued on April 1, 1980; March 27, 1981; March 15, 1982; April 1,

1983; April 5, 1984; April 12, 1985; and April 10, 1986. By May 1985, virtually all of
the material in the 1985 draft had been submitted to, and tentatively, approved by,
the ALI. At the request of administration officials, final adoption of the revisions was
postponed for a year to give the Department of State and the Department of Justice
further opportunity to review the sixth draft revisions. Statement of President Roswell B. Perkins, 62 A.L.I. PROC. 374-77 (1985). Ultimately, the Restatement Third
was approved at the ALI's 1986 annual meeting. 1986 Proceedings, 63 A.L.I. PROC.

140-41 (1986).
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lyzes the jurisdictional provisions in the Restatement Second
and contrasts them with corresponding sections in the Restatement Third. Part II examines issues that have arisen under the
Restatement Second jurisdictional scheme. Part III examines
those same issues in light of the Restatement Third modifications. This Note 'Concludes that the Restatement Third provisions limiting extraterritorial prescriptions function as abstention principles developed by the U.S. judiciary, and that in order to determine the outermost limits of U.S. jurisdiction
under international law, the executive and legislative branches
should be guided by principles commonly understood by a
consensus of the international community as acceptable extraterritorial prescriptions.
I. MODIFICATIONS TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION UNDER THE
RESTATEMENT THIRD
Both restatements contain three major provisions onjurisdiction: first, they specify types of jurisdiction;' second, they
enumerate bases for prescriptive jurisdiction; 9 and third, they
provide for limitations on jurisdiction where possible bases for
prescription by two or more states overlap.' 0 The major
changes to these sections in the Restatement Third are in its
split of jurisdiction into three types (as opposed to two in the
Restatement Second)," its expansion of "effect within the territory" as a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction,' 2 and its relaxation of the limitations placed on a state's right to prescribe and
enforce laws extraterritorially. '"
A. -Jurisdiction:A Basic Approach
The definition of jurisdiction is set out in section 6 of the
Restatement Second as follows: "'Jurisdiction,' as used in the
Restatement of this Subject, means the capacity of a state
under international law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of
8. See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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law."'

4

"To prescribe," in this context, refers to the lawmak-

ing process, regardless of whether it arises out of the exercise
of authority of the legislative, executive, orjudicial branch (this
is referred to as prescription or prescriptive jurisdiction).' 5
"To enforce," on the other hand, means to enforce rules properly prescribed (this authority is referred to as enforcement jurisdiction). t6 The interrelationship between the two is further
addressed in section 7: "(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law does not necessarily have jurisdiction to
enforce it in all cases. (2) A state does not have jurisdiction to
enforce a rule of law prescribed by it unless it had jurisdiction
to prescribe that rule."' 7 Thus, valid prescriptive jurisdiction

is a prerequisite to valid enforcement jurisdiction, and any limitations placed on prescriptive jurisdiction will operate to limit
8
enforcement as well.'
The Restatement Third expands these two types of jurisdiction into three.' 9 According to section 401, international
law subjects a state to limitations on its authority to exercise
prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction.2 °
"Prescriptive jurisdiction" is defined as the application of a
14. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 6.
15. Id. comment a.
16. Id.
17. Id.§ 7.
18. For example, the Restatement Second limits application of the "effects" basis ofjurisdiction as a prescription in § 18. See infra note 33. Those same limitations
would effectively limit enforcement under § 7 as well. See supra text accompanying
note 17.
19. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 401; infra note 20. "The change
from the dual concept to the triad concept according to the Reporters was necessary
because the earlier concept was too simple. My own view is anything that's simple in
the law is so unusual and unique that it should be preserved." Report of the Panel
Proceedings: The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Revised: How
Were the Controversies Resolved? 18 (1987) [hereinafter Panel] (remarks of Cecil Olinstead) (draft available at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office) (to be published
in 81 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. - (1987)).
20. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 401. The text of § 401 reads as follows:
Under international law, a state is subject to limitations on
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or pun-
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state's law to the activities, relations, or status of personsagain, whether by the legislative, executive, or judicial
branch. 2 1 "Adjudicative jurisdiction" is the authority to subject persons or things to the process of a state's courts or proceedings, and "enforcement jurisdiction" is the authority to
compel compliance or punish noncompliance with the laws of
a state.22
This provision introduces a number of modifications to
the earlier jurisdictional scheme. First, it eliminates the facet
of jurisdiction that covers the process of creating law; thus all
subsequent limitations on jurisdiction appear to speak only to
the application, as opposed to the creation, of a particular rule
of law.23
Second, under the Restatement Second, the authority of a
state to enforce its laws would only exist subject to limitations
placed on both enforcement and prescriptive (lawmaking) jurisdiction.2 4 The same authority under the Restatement Third
(termed "prescriptive") would exist subject only to those limitations that apply expressly to prescriptive jurisdiction.2 5
Third, under the Restatement Second, prescriptive jurisdiction arises under international law, implying that a state's
authority should either be granted or acknowledged by customary international law.2 6 The Restatement Third, on the
other hand, presents jurisdiction subject to limitation under international law, there being a presumption of jurisdiction in
the absence of an explicit limitation.2 7
ish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts
or by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Panel, supra note 19, at 19.
24. See supra text accompanying note 17.
25. See infra note 49.
26. See supra text accompanying note 14.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. This concept finds support in early
caselaw. In S.S. Lotus (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), a French
steamer collided with a Turkish vessel in international waters, killing eight Turkish
nationals. The officer on watch on the French vessel at the time of the accident was
later arrested in Turkey and charged with involuntary manslaughter under Turkish
law. The issue of whether the prosecution violated international law was submitted
by the governments of both France and Turkey to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which held that a state cannot exercise its power in the territory of
another state absent a specific grant under international law. However, with regard
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Finally, the very definition of "international law" in the
Restatement Third reflects a shift in emphasis favoring a state
tribunal's authority to declare principles of international law.
While the Restatement Second identified "international law"
as being the ALI's view of rules that an "international tribunal" would apply in deciding a controversy in accordance with
international law, 28 the Restatement Third altered this standard to read an "impartial tribunal. ' 29 This redefinition opens
the possibility that decisions of a federal court could be interpreted as declarations of international law, if it could be successfully argued that the court was an impartial tribunal deciding a controversy in accordance with international law.
B., Bases ofJurisdiction to Prescribe
The bases ofjurisdiction in the Restatement Second draw
upon traditional principles of international law3 0 that have
found general acceptance abroad; these bases of jurisdiction
include territory 3' and nationality.3 2 As an offshoot of the
traditional territoriality principle, section 18 recognizes the
to the exercise of jurisdiction within its own territory, a state may act in the absence
of explicit limitations under international law. Thus, the court affirmed Turkey's authority. Id.
28. See supra note 6.
29. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, at 3., This change was not actually incorporated into the Restatement Third until 1986, seven years and six tentative drafts
after the project was begun. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). The change has been justifiably criticized, not only foe its substance, but also for being such a fundamental alter-

ation of the "yardstick against which things are tested," long after many segments of
the Restatement Third had been considered and approved by the ALI, presumably
under the old Restatement Second standard. See Panel, supra note 19, at 27 (remarks
of Monroe Leigh). The standard was changed under pressure from the Department
of State, which at the time took the position that the International Court of Justice
was not an "impartial" tribunal. See id. at 28; id. at 38 (remarks of Detlev Vagts); see
also Remarks of Prof. Louis Henkin, 63 A.L.I. PROC. 105 (1986) (standard changed
because the administration was "very allergic" to the International Court ofJustice).
Allowing the Department of State to assume so substantial a role in the ALI's work
product, while at the same time allowing it to disclaim the Restatement Third, see
supra note 7, at IX, will probably only result in confusion abroad. See Panel, supra
note 19, at 11 (remarks of Detlev Vagts).
30. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 10. See generally HarvardResearch on
InternationalLaw: Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L. L. 435, 445 (Supp.
1935) (discussing the most widely accepted bases for jurisdiction under international
law).
31. See, e.g., European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891, 893 (1982) [hereinafter EEC Memorandum] ("[Tihe
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more controversial "effects" doctrine, wherein a state may
have prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside
its territory that causes an effect within.33 The effects doctrine
is limited to rare circumstances when conduct is generally recognized as a crime; the effect within the territory is direct, substantial, and foreseeable; and the rule is consistent with the
principles of justice in states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.34
The Restatement Third enumerates bases of jurisdiction
to prescribe in section 402.35 Within this section, the second
and third subsections outline the "nationality" and "protective" principles ofjurisdiction.36 Subsection (1) deals with the
notion that a state should restrict its rule-making in principle "o persons and goods
within its territory ... is a fundamental notion of international law ....").
32. See, e.g., id. (prescription of rules governing nationals, wherever located, is a
generally accepted basis for jurisdiction under international law).
33. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18. The effects doctrine receives
the following treatment in the Restatement Second:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id.; compare id. with infra note 35 (either actual or intended effects sufficient to support
exercise of jurisdiction).
34. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18; supra note 33.
35. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 402.

Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that
is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other
state interests.
Id.

36. Id. § 402(2)-(3); see supra note 30.
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3 7
two of
principle of territoriality under three approaches:
these allow a right to prescribe with respect to conduct within
the territory or the status of persons or things present within
the state; 8 the third allows a state to prescribe law with respect
to "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory."' 39 Although the Restatement Third takes a traditional approach to territorial jurisdiction generally, this last subsection substantially relaxes the
more stringent requirements on the effects doctrine found in
the Restatement Second.4" While the Restatement Second requires direct, substantial, and foreseeable effects,4 1 under the
Restatement Third the effect need not be actual, but merely
intended.4 2 Actual but unintended effects would also be sufficient to support jurisdiction.4 3 And finally, the Restatement
Third eliminates the requirement that the conduct in question
be generally recognized as a crime in the international community.4 4

C. Limitations on Jurisdiction
Both the Restatement Second and the Restatement Third
recognize that conflict may arise when two states concurrently
exercise jurisdiction. The Restatement Second approaches
this problem, in section 40, as one of the proper exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction.4 5 While the first prerequisite to enforcement jurisdiction is valid prescriptive jurisdiction, the impact of enforcement jurisdiction is then further ameliorated by
97.

RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7,
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7,
39. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7,
40. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note
34 and accompanying text.

38.

§ 402(1); see supra note 35.
§ 402(1); see supra note 35.
§ 402(1)(c); see supra note 35.
7, § 402(l)(c); supra note 35; cf. notes 33-

41. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
See
See

RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT

THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(l)(c); supra note 35.
THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(1)(c); supra note 35.
THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(1)(c); supra note 35.
SECOND, supra note 1, § 40. Section 40 reads in pertinent

part:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith,
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section 40.46 Where the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction by
two or more states might require inconsistent conduct, section
40 requires a state to consider in good faith moderating its enforcement jurisdiction. 4 7 This consideration is stated as an express requirement of international law.4 8
The Restatement Third provides for conflict resolution in
section 403 under the heading "Limitations on Jurisdiction to
Prescribe."4 9 This section states, first, the so-called "rule of
reason," which is the foundation of the Restatement Third balmoderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such
factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 403. Section 403 reads:

(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present,
a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise ofjurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, suchas nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those
whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
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ancing test. 50 Under this rule, a state may not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over persons or things having connections with other states where the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable. 5 Reasonableness, in this provision, is to be
measured by evaluating all relevant factors, including certain
nonexclusive factors listed in subsection (2).52 Where the prescriptions by two or more states are both reasonable, but conflict nonetheless, each state must evaluate its own, as well as
the other state's, interest and should defer to the other state if
that state's interest is clearly greater.5 3
In this area, the Restatement Third has taken perhaps the
most radical departure from the Restatement Second. First,
under the Restatement Second, the good-faith weighing of interests is presented as a requirement of international law.5 4
Under the Restatement Third, however, a state "has an obligation" to evaluate, but "should" defer if the other state's interest is "clearly" greater. 55 The actual moderation of jurisdiction is presented more as an exercise of deference based on
principles of comity.56
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well
as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater.
Id.
50. See id. The "rule of reason" itself is a somewhat controversial standard, and
has been criticized as being unsupported either by federal or international law. See
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("[N]o rule of international law [holds] that a 'more reasonable' assertion of
jurisdiction mandatorily displaces a 'less reasonable' assertion ....");see also Panel,
supra note 19, at 21 (remarks of Cecil Olmstead) (questioning whether the concept of
reasonableness is established, either in the United States or internationally); see generally Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatenent, 50 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1001 (1987) (discussing possible origins of reasonableness in conflict of laws
principles).
51. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 403(1); see supra note 49.
52. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 403(2); see supra note 49.
53. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 403(3); see supra note 49.
54. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (considering balancing factors
is an express requirement of international law).
55. See supra text accompanying note 53.
56. See infra note 93.
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Second, the Restatement Third places less emphasis on
territoriality. Instead, it focuses on elements such as the nature of the activity, the effect on the regulating state, and the
interests of both the regulating and territorial states, which interests are measured by the amount of regulation generally exercised. These factors are far more difficult to quantify than
the narrowly defined factors of the Restatement Second.5"
Thus, they open the door to a substantially broader interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Finally, the Restatement Third limitations turn on the
concept of reasonableness. 9 This leaves open to the courts
the interpretation of the meaning of reasonableness. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether a state must defer
when another state's interest is somewhat greater, but not
"clearly" greater."

II. ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE RESTATEMENT
SECOND FORMULA TION
Although restatements are not binding sources of law,
they are nonetheless widely consulted by U.S. courts. 61 Three
major issues have arisen with the use of the jurisdictional
57. See supra note 49. Two of the factors in § 403(2) in particular focus on the
extent of a state's regulation: § 403(2)(c) refers to "the extent to which other states
regulate such activities ..."and § 403(2)(g) refers to "the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity." These factors may be misleading in that they fail to consider the interest a state may have in maintaining an unregulated environment. For example, the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in
1977-78, Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978);
Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278 (1977), resulted both in lowered fares to consumers and the largest profits ever in the history
of domestic aviation. See Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies " The'Deregulation of
InternationalAir Transport, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 305, 328 (1987). However, as the state's
interest is in allowing market factors to be the regulating force, see id., it would not be
accurate to say that the degree of U.S. interest in the airline industry is somehow
proportional to the amount of regulation the government exercises as per
§ 403(2)(c) and (g).
58. See supra note 45.
59. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
60. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 949
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (examining feasibility of a court's making an accurate determination
of greater and lesser state interests).
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Rosenthal, JurisdictionalConflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAw. 487, 488 (1985) ("United States courts
have often relied on the Restatement as an accurate articulation of international
law.").
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scheme outlined in the Restatement Second: (1) expansive interpretation of "effects within the territory," (2) imperfections
inherent in systematically resorting to judicial interest-balancing in the resolution of jurisdictional clashes, and (3) the difficulty of adapting this judicially-developed procedure for use by
the executive and legislative branches. In order to understand
how these issues were treated in the Restatement Third, it is
necessary to examine briefly the context in which they arose.
A. The Effects Doctrine
The modern-day effects doctrine originated in the 1945
62
antitrust case United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA).
Under ALCOA, U.S. antitrust laws may be applied whenever
conduct abroad is intended to, and results in, substantial effects within the United States. 6 3 This concept of effects jurisdiction was modified and incorporated into the Restatement
Second as a general jurisdictional principle.6 4 The element of
intent was deleted, and the application of effects jurisdiction
was limited to two situations. First, it may apply where "the
conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems." '65 Alternatively, effects
jurisdiction may apply where the impact of the conduct is substantial, direct, and foreseeable, and the rule of law is "not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
'
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems. "66
These two provisions have worked as a check on a state's ability to interpret broadly the somewhat open-ended meaning of
62. 148 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1945); see Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 925; Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1032 (1985).
63. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 443.
64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; discussion at 39 A.L.I. PROC. 319
(1962); Panel, supra note 19, at 23 (remarks of Cecil Olmstead).
65. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18(a), reporter's notes 1-2. The Restatement Second traces effects jurisdiction back to S.S. Lotus, (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), which held that injury to Turkish nationals on international waters produced an effect within the territory of Turkey sufficient to support
the exercise ofjurisdiction over the French national responsible for that injury. Id. at
32; see RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18, reporter's note 1.

66.

RESTATEMENT SECOND,

supra note 1, § 18(b).
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"effects within the territory.

' 67

Even within these narrow confines, effects jurisdiction has
been criticized abroad, and its application both within and beyond the area of antitrust remains controversial.6 8 The provision has, for example, been incorporated into U.S. securities
law, allowing U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction (and its attendant
enforcement mechanisms) to reach parties worldwide.69 Because a substantial portion of U.S. securities law cannot be said
to be "generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems," 7 ° effects jurisdiction will generally be applied
to securities cases under the Restatement Second section
18(b), which requires, first, the effect within the United States
to be direct, substantial and foreseeable and, second, the rule
of law to be not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of justice. 7 '
The effects doctrine was first introduced to securities law
67. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Symposium, TransnationalLitigation-PartII: Perspectivesfrom the U.S.
and Abroad, 18 INT'L LAw. 771 (1984) [hereinafter Symposium]. Switzerland takes the
position that territorial jurisdiction supercedes effects jurisdiction, id. at 790, while
the United Kingdom objects to extraterritorial assertions by the United States on
principles of international law, id. at 773. Generally, effects jurisdiction is less widely
accepted under international law than the traditional bases of territory and nationality. EEC Memorandum, supra note 31, at 896.
[T]he United States, so far as I have been able to determine, is the only
nation or authority (including the European Economic Community) that
claims the right to enforce its jurisdiction unilaterally to override, in peacetime, contrary national laws or fundamental policies of foreign states concerning conduct taking place wholly or in significant part within foreign territory.
Rosenthal, supra note 61, at 488-89.
69. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
70. See supra text accompanying note 65. For example, Japanese insider trading
provisions, modelled after the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§§ 10(b), 16(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78p(b) (1982), and rule 10(b)(5), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 1Ob-5 (1988); see Tsunematsu, Yanese, Yasuda & Tokuoka,Japan, in 3 Int'l Sec.
Reg. (Oceana) Booklet 1: Commentary 62-69 (June 1986), tend not to be frequently
invoked or strictly enforced. See id. at 68; Tatsuta,Japan, in 1OC Int'l Cap Mkt. & Sec.
Reg. (Clark Boardman) §§ 11.10-.14 (H. Bloomenthal ed. Aug. 1988) (general antifraud provision not regarded as a source of private remedy).
71. See supra note 33; supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,72 where the Second Circuit upheld
U.S. jurisdiction over a derivative suit brought on behalf of a
Canadian corporation, despite the fact that the challenged
transaction involved Canadian stock and had taken place in
Canada." Because the stock itself had been registered on the
American Stock Exchange, the Second Circuit held that an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was necessary "to protect
the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities. 7 4
The effects doctrine was applied again to an international
75
securities transaction in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.
Tamari involved misrepresentations made in Lebanon by a
Lebanese defendant to a Lebanese plaintiff, where the defendant placed orders through its U.S. parent company's Chicago
office for execution on two different U.S. exchanges.7 6 The
trial court held that "in a case such as this, where the challenged transactions involve trading on domestic exchanges,
harm can be presumed, because the fraud alleged implicates
77
the integrity of the American market."
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws eventually
came into direct conflict with Swiss bank secrecy laws in SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana.78 In that case, the defendant, a
Swiss bank, refused to disclose to the. SEC the identities of its
customers in Switzerland, claiming that disclosure would subject it to criminal liability under Swiss penal and banking law. 7 9
Applying the Restatement Second test to resolve the conflict,
the district court found the United States's interest in the protection of its securities markets sufficiently compelling to justify a U.S. order directing the Swiss bank to comply with the
discovery order.8 0 Switzerland, however, was satisfied with
neither the end result nor the process by which that result was
72. 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969).
73. Id. at 208.
74. Id. at 206.
75. 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. I1. 1982), aff'd 730 F.2d 1,103 (7th Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 310.
77. Id. at 313.
78. 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79. Id. at 117.
80. Id. at 112.
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achieved. 1
B. Resolution ofJurisdictionalConflicts:
The Interest-BalancingApproach
The balancing test set forth in the Restatement Second
section 4082 was adopted in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America"3 to aid in the resolution of an international antitrust
dispute. In Timberlane, the effects doctrine was criticized as being "by itself ...

incomplete because it fails to consider other

nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the
full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country." 84 By requiring an analysis of this relationship,
Timberlane modified ALCOA; this modification took the form of
the balancing test of the Restatement Second section

4 0 .'5

The court noted that federal antitrust statutes, like much fed86
eral regulation, contain "sweeping jurisdictional language";
"it is evident that at some point the interests of the United
States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction."8 " The court further observed a distinct feature of antitrust law: commercial market reactions, on which "effects" jurisdiction is often based, generally extend well beyond the
borders of the United States. 8 Thus, the interest-balancing
test was seen as a method by which the substantiality of the
effect could be determined; whether the effect within the
81. See Symposium, supra note 68, at 790.
If secrecy has to be lifted against the will of its master, this can be properly
done only by compulsion that is imposed by Swiss authorities, not by a U.S.
court that punishes the party or witness with contempt sanctions. The balance of interests test is no solution since Switzerland, among many other
nations, opposes it and does not accept that a U.S. court may decide under
what circumstances Swiss law has no effect on Swiss territory.
Id.
82. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 40; see supra note 45.
83. 549 F.2d 597 (1976), aff'd on rehearing, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
84. Id. at 611-12.
85. See id. at 613-14.
86. Id. at 609 n.14.
87. Id. at 609.
88. Id. at 611. " '[Alnything that affects the external trade and commerce of the
United States also affects the trade and commerce of other nations, and may have far
greater consequences for others than for the United States.' " Id. (quoting Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956)).
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United States was substantial would be determined by comparison with the effect abroad. 89
Timberlane, in examining the Restatement Second balancing test, made two important observations about the test itself.
First, it noted that the Restatement Second test "was obviously
fashioned with trade regulation problems in mind, for all five
illustrations presented in the comment to this section involve
such regulation." 90 Second, it noted that section 40 indicates
that " 'jurisdictional' forebearance in the international setting

is more a question of comity and fairness than one of international power." 9' This interpretation is reinforced by the fact
that section 40 counsels moderation of enforcement, rather
than prescriptive, jurisdiction; 9 2 a state may have jurisdiction
to prescribe law but nonetheless, under section 40, should refrain from enforcing that prescription in deference to legal and
policy interests of another state. This suggests that section
40's function is that of an abstention provision, rather than a
definition of the outermost boundaries of a state's jurisdictional reach.9 3 Thus, section 40 allowed a degree of judicial
discretion, although it failed to ensure that the United States
89. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610-13.
90. Id. at 613 n.27.
91. Id.; see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979). "When foreign nations are involved . . . it is unwise to ignore the fact that
foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or declinejurisdiction." Id. at
1296 (emphasis added).
92. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 40; supra note 45.
93. Abstention doctrine allows a court with valid jurisdiction over a dispute to
decline from exercising that jurisdiction in a limited set of circumstances. See generally, WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1983). For example, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a valid lower court injunction barring a local district attorney from prosecuting an individual, despite the
lower court's authority to enjoin, admittedly existing under 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The
Supreme Court supported its action on principles of "comity," or a "proper respect
for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a
Union of state governments." Id. at 44. Considerations of comity in the federal-state
relationship are analogous to considerations of comity in the international context.
Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text. The difficulty remains where foreign states
do not accept the United States's presumption ofjurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction
is not actually exercised:
[T]he U.S. courts claim subject matter jurisdiction over activities of nonU.S. persons outside the U.S.A. to an extent which is quite unacceptable to
the U.K. and many other nations. Although in recognition of international
objections to the wide reach of anti-trust law enforcement in civil cases, the
U.S. courts have begun to devise tests which may limit the circumstances in
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would interpret its own prescriptive jurisdiction abroad as
subordinate to that of the territorial state.
C. ExtraterritorialAssertions of the Executive
and Legislative Branches
The Restatement Second's jurisdictional provisions define
prescriptive jurisdiction as the capacity of a state to make law,
whether by the legislative, executive, or judicial branch.94
However, as noted in the previous section, the limitations of
section 40 appear to function as abstention principles rather
than as jurisdictional limits and, thus, are more likely to be
read as speaking solely to the judicial branch.95 In practical
terms, this means that the executive and legislative branches
might not apply the balancing of interests to limit their extraterritorial prescriptions.
This was precisely the situation that arose in 1982, when,
in an attempt to inhibit the construction of the Soviet transSiberian pipeline, the U.S. Department of Commerce amended
the U.S. Export Administration Regulations.9 6 The amended
regulations required permission of the U.S. government
before any goods or technological data of U.S. origin could be
exported or re-exported to the Soviet Union, if such goods or
data related to oil and gas exploration, transmission, or refinement.9 7 The restrictions were to apply to "person[s] subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States," defined as including not
only U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations, but also any
person within the United States and "[a]ny partnership, association, corporation, or other organization, wherever organized
or doing business, that is owned or controlled" by any of the
persons or entities enumerated above. 98 The European Ecowhich the remedy may be available, these tests remain within these wider
claims to jurisdiction to which Her Majesty's Government object.
United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading
Interests Bill, 21 I.L.M. 847, 849-50 (1982).
94. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 6 comment a; see supra text accompanying note 15.
95. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.

96. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982), amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 379, 385 (1982),
repealed by 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
97. Id.
98. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,252 (1982), amending 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2) (1982), repealed by 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982). The broad sweep of this provision would mean
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nomic Community (the "EEC") responded with a memorandum (the "EEC Memorandum") 9 9 that was sharply critical of
the United States's attempt to extend its jurisdiction, solely on
the basis of control by U.S. shareholders, to EEC-registered
corporations doing business in Europe.10 0
The EEC Memorandum, relying on the Restatement Second as a valid statement of U.S. policy,' 0 ' noted that the
United States failed to evaluate EEC interests in four ways:
first, the EEC interest in regulating foreign trade of its own
nationals is paramount over U.S. foreign policy purposes; second, conduct would take place within the territory of the EEC
and not within the United States;' third, nationality ties may be
stronger to EEC Member States than to the United States; and
fourth, justified expectations of these EEC nationals might be
hurt by the measures.'
The EEC Memorandum also noted
that interest-balancing should take place at the rule-making
stage, because the offending legislation "may not be subject to
substantive judicial review. This means that U.S. Courts may
not be able to apply their balancing of interests approach in a
clash of enforcement jurisdiction. It is therefore appropriate
for the executive to apply it at the rule-making stage."' 0 3
Although the amendments to the U.S. Export Administration Regulations were later repealed,'0 " the question remains
as to whether' the political branches consider themselves
bound by the limitations of the interest-balancing test. This
question remains unanswered in the Restatement Third's jurisdictional scheme.
III. THE RESTATEMENT THIRD PROVISIONS
The cases outlined above evidence no clear consensus of
international law to support the principles that underly the
that a foreign businessperson traveling through the United States would be subject
to U.S. export controls if he or she controlled a foreign-registered business operating
entirely abroad, if that business exported the forbidden technology to the Soviet
Union, even though the business might be operating within the law in its own territory. Id.
99. See EEC Memorandum, supra note 31.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 899-901.
102. Id. at 901.
103. Id. at 900.
104. See 47 Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982).
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United States's broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 0 5 It is further evident that restatements are relied upon
07
06
for guidance, both within the United States' and abroad.'
Whether or not the U.S. government (or, in fact, any sovereign) chooses to act within boundaries generally accepted
within the international community, it is nonetheless helpful to
each state to understand where those boundaries are. An examination of the Restatement Third provisions demonstrates
that it has failed to accomplish such a purpose.
First, in its treatment of effects jurisdiction, the Restatement Third creates a provision with less common law support
and fewer limitations than that. which existed under the Restatement Second.10 8 Second, its interest-balancing formula
gives inadequate guidance to the judiciary on how enforcement jurisdiction might be moderated, while at the same time,
it fails to safeguard against improper extraterritorial prescriptions on the part of the political branches. 0 9 Finally, it should
be emphasized that conflicts of policy, rather than of prescriptions, are the true source ofjurisdictional conflicts. These conflicts are more appropriately resolved through diplomatic communication with the territorial state, not through unilateral interest-balancing by the judiciary." t0
A. Effects Jurisdiction Under the Restatement Third
In SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, "' the Restatement
Second formulation of effects jurisdiction was used to justify
attempts to extend the reach of U.S. law and its attendant enforcement mechanisms so as to override the territorial authority of Switzerland." 2 The decision was criticized by the Swiss
as an unacceptable intrusion,' 13 thus illustrating the question
of the degree to which effects jurisdiction may or may not be
recognized internationally.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra notes 68, 81, 93, and text accompanying note 102.
See supra note 5.
See EEC Memorandum, supra note 31, at 899.
See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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If it is questionable whether the Restatement Second formulation of effects jurisdiction has found acceptance
abroad," l4 the Restatement Third can hardly be said to have
brought respectability to it. Antitrust jurisdiction, from which
the effects doctrine was originally drawn, is treated in a separate provision; this provision, in accordance with ALCOA, reI5
quires both actual and intended effects within the territory."
The Restatement Third formulation of effects jurisdiction,
however, draws a general jurisdictional principle that extraterritorial conduct may be subject to regulation where there is
either actual or intended effect within the territory of the regulating state.'t 6 This principle broadens the Restatement Second's application of "effects" jurisdiction in three ways. First,
it allows for prescription where there is nothing more than the
intent to cause effects within the territory of a state." 7 Second,
effects jurisdiction is no longer limited to conduct that is generally recognized as a crime or tort under the law of states that
have reasonably developed legal systems." l8 And third, the
separation of securities and antitrust jurisdiction from the gen114. See supra note 68.
115. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 415.
Jurisdiction to Regulate Anti-Competitive Activities
(1) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made in
the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade
that is carried out in significant measure in the United States, are subject to
the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, regardless of the nationality or place of business of the parties to the agreement or of the participants
in the conduct.
(2) Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made
outside of the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of
such trade that is carried out predominantly outside of the United States,
are subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principal
purpose of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of
the United States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that
commerce.
(3) Other agreements or conduct in restraint of United States trade are
subject to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States if such agreements or conduct have substantial effect on the commerce of the United
States and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable.
Id.; see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. A similar provision is given with
respect to jurisdiction to regulate securities. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7,
§ 416.
116. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(1)(c); supra note 35.
117. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(l)(c); supra note 35.
118. Compare RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 402(1)(c); supra note 35 with
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18; supra note 33 (requiring extraterritorial
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eral provision may have the effect of releasing effects jurisdiction from limitations that have in the past been imposed by
common law. This is because antitrust and securities cases,
while applying the Restatement Second jurisdictional test,
would nonetheless be bound by common-law jurisdictional
tests as well.11 9 As the Restatement Third treats these two areas in separate provisions,12 0 the general area of effects jurisdiction now stands free of these additional common-law limitations. While the separate treatment of securities and antitrust
jurisdiction implies that the general effects provision will be
invoked with less frequency, it also implies that once invoked,
the provision might allow "effects" to be interpreted more
broadly. Thus, the Restatement Third has substantially relaxed limitations on a state's permissible exercise of effects jurisdiction, while increasing the likelihood that such exercise
will conflict with the laws of the territorial state.
B. Interest-BalancingUnder the Restatement Third
1. Judicial Interest-Balancing
The interest-balancing test of the Restatement Third, as
outlined above, presents a formula with which a state must
consider the reasonableness

of its prescriptions.' 2 '

The

formula was put to a practical test in Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airways. 122 In Laker, the D.C. Circuit was called
upon to review the propriety of a district court's preliminary
injunction barring the defendant airlines from seeking antisuit
injunctions in the United Kingdom against the plaintiff; 123 defendants in a previous suit had sought and obtained such relief
24
both before and after the initiation of U.S. antitrust action.
In upholding the injunction, the court examined the jurisdicconduct and effect to be generally recognized as elements of a crime or tort under
the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems).
119. For example, an antitrust controversy would still require the element of
intent to cause effects under ALCOA, even though the Restatement Second had no
such requirement. Compare supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text with RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 18; supra note 33 (requiring actual effects but no intent
to cause effects).
120. See supra note 115.
121. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
122. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 915.
124. See id. at 914-15.
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tional tests in both the Restatement Second and the Restate-

ment Third. 2

5

While most of the balancing factors listed in

section 403 were acknowledged as being useful to the determination as to whether sufficient national contacts exist to support a finding of jurisdiction, "their usefulness breaks down
when a court is faced with the task of selecting one forum's
prescriptive jurisdiction over that of another."' 12 6 Furthermore, the opinion notes that factors such as the interest of
other states in regulation and the likelihood of conflict might
be useful insofar as they forecast whether a conflict will arise,
but give no guidance as to how such a conflict should be resolved. 1 27 Finally, the remaining factors "generally incorporate purely political factors which the court is neither qualified
to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing."128
In examining these political factors, the court unearthed a
further defect in the interest-balancing approach, namely, that
where political branches of the government have relied upon a
valid base of prescriptive jurisdiction to enact law in furtherance of national policy, the desirability of that law is not an
appropriate subject for judicial review.' 2 9 The Restatement
125. See id. at 948-50.
126. Id. at 948.
127. See id. at 948-49.
128. Id. at 949.
129. Id. This defect may be further exacerbated by the Restatement Third's
having shifted the emphasis in the definition of prescriptive jurisdiction from the process of making the law to the process of applying it; the balancing of interests would
now seem beyond question to be a judicial function, rather than a legislative function. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In a footnote, the Laker decision recognizes that
[b]ecause Congress and the Executive can neither anticipate nor resolve all
conflicts with foreign prescriptive jurisdiction, they legitimately expect the
full participation of the Judiciary in minimizing conflicts of jurisdiction ....
Evaluating the strength of the United States interests in a particular transaction to determine the reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with those expectations and assures that concurrent jurisdiction will
never be lightly assumed.
Laker, 731 F.2d at 952 n. 169. This observation allows for a measure of moderation in
the form of abstention; if the U.S. basis of jurisdiction is not overly broad, factors
such as those enumerated in RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 1, § 40; see supra note
45, which focus on territorial links, would give appropriate guidance to a court.
However, the Laker decision notes that the factors enumerated in the Restatement
Third test focus more on political concerns that ar beyond the judiciary's authority
to consider. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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Third defines-and thus limits-prescriptive jurisdiction without regard to whether it arises out of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch. 30 However, with regard to limitations on
prescriptive jurisdiction, these "political factors" are generally
presented to the judiciary, which is the one branch of the government for whom, in the absence of constitutional violation,
the authority to overturn a particular law is most in doubt.
2. Executive and Legislative Interest-Balancing
As with the Restatement Second, the Restatement Third
balancing test applies to prescriptions generally, whether they
arise out of the exercise of executive, legislative or judicial
13 2
power.' 3 ' In a situation such as the pipeline controversy,

the political branches would have been expected to determine
the reasonableness of an assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over
EEC nationals acting lawfully within their own territory. 33 As
noted above, the factors enumerated in section 403 incorporate concerns of national interest and international comityconcerns that are appropriate for consideration by those political branches.13 4 However, as the EEC Memorandum noted,
the political branches failed to engage in a good-faith balancing of interests when expanding the reach of U.S. export controls. 135

The problem here was not with the factors themselves, but
rather with the expectation that the political branches would
fairly balance U.S. and foreign interests. In the litigation context, from which the concept of interest-balancing was drawn,
opposing interests will be presented to an (ideally) impartial
judge. The adversarial process provides a forum for the presentation of these opposing interests, and this forum is, for the
most part, unique to the judicial branch. The executive and
legislative branches, on the other hand, often operate solely to
the benefit of their own constituency in a politically sensitive
(and often emotionally charged) climate. When given the task
of balancing U.S. and foreign interests, these branches will be
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 403; supra note 45.
See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 102.
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less likely to favor the greater interest than the more popular
one. While criticism abroad has indeed focused on the need
for moderation by U.S. lawmakers," 6 the real problem is not
so much moderation within the boundaries of the United
States's subjective interpretation of its own jurisdiction, but
rather a clearer understanding of the limits of U.S. jurisdiction
under international law.' 37 A clearer statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law would have met this
need.
The Restatement Third has expanded the permissible bases for jurisdiction;13 8 it has not presented actual moderation
as a requirement of international law, and has not brought federal interpretations of jurisdiction in line with those accepted
3
by the international community.' 1
C. National Policies: The Source of the Conflict
When a criminal fires a gun across an international border
and wounds a victim on the other side, most states in the international community would be in agreement, more or less, on
the conduct in question being recognized as a crime or a tort.
Among friendly nations, and all other factors being equal,
there would be no true jurisdictional conflict, as both states
would be in agreement on the need to deter violent criminal
behavior. 40 True jurisdictional conflicts arise where the inter136. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 82-93; see also Rosenthal, supra note 61, at 488-91.
138. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
139. The Restatement Third acknowledges that federal law may be inconsistent
with "international" law. The federal prescription does not then become invalid
under international law; however, its enforcement may subject the United States to
liability under international law. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 7, § 115. It is
difficult to see how this approach provides comfort to a foreign litigant being prosecuted in the United States under U.S. export controls. See supra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text.
140. See Remarks of Adrian S. Fisher, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 316 (1962).
Well, when you get to the conventional crimes, there has really been no
argument between any of the various proponents on [effects jurisdiction] ....
[W]e used rather esoteric illustrations because my colleagues on
the reportorial staff had threatened to resign if I ever used the term "shooting across the border" again ....
I came back from Switzerland about a
month ago, and, lo and behold, there was a bona fide international dispute
in which a Swiss border guard shot and severely wounded an Italian after a
slight difference of opinion that grew up over a customs matter.
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ests of nations differ: where the U.S. policy of securities enforcement comes into conflict with the Swiss policy of bank
confidentiality,1 4 1 where U.S. policy encouraging private antitrust actions conflicts with British policies against private attorneys-general, 42 or where U.S. policy regarding the Soviet
trans-Siberian pipeline is inconsistent with European Economic Community policy.' 43 In these situations, and in those

to arise in the future, conflicts can better be resolved through
good-faith diplomatic efforts.
The problem with the Restatement Second jurisdictional
provisions was that the balancing of interests was more
adapted to judicial abstention than to executive and legislative
moderation; this defect has been carried through to the Restatement Third despite the adoption of political factors in the
interest-balancing test. Where conflicting prescriptions arise
out of clashes in national policy, it is unlikely that either the
executive or the legislative branch (and, as a consequence, the
judiciary) will see another state's political concerns as paramount over U.S. interests. Judicial abstention itself is a wise
solution in circumstances where jurisdictional clashes are unforeseeable; in such situations, it is appropriate for the judiciary to weigh interests under federal law. However, to avoid
these clashes where possible, the U.S. government must have a
clear understanding of what is acceptable prescription in the
international community. Excessive reliance on the Restatement Third jurisdictional test will not further this end: to be
141. Compare S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (compelling disclosure of defendant's clients in violation of Swiss
penal and banking law necessary to protect vital U.S. interests) with Symposium, supra
note 68, at 789-90 (bank secrecy is a firmly entrenched principle of Swiss law).
142. Compare United States Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading

Interests Bill, 21 I.L.M. 840, 843 (1982) ("United States antitrust law reflects a public
policy so important to the United States that violations carry criminal penalties. The
private treble damage action is a crucial aspect of United States antitrust enforcement.") with United Kingdom Response to U.S. DiplomaticNote Concerningthe U.K. Protection

of Trading Interests Bill, 21 I.L.M. 847, 849 (U.K. policy opposes private enforcement
of public law) and Symposium, supra note 68, at 775.
143. See EEC Memorandum, supra note 31, at 895.

The practical impact of the Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations is that E.C. companies are pressed into service to carry out U.S.
trade policy towards the U.S.S.R., even though these companies are incorporated and have their registered office[s] within the Community which has
its own trade policy towards the U.S.S.R.
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effective, jurisdictional boundaries, no less than national
boundaries, must be clearly drawn.
CONCLUSION
The value of a restatement is in the guidance that it gives
to both the U.S. government and those with whom the United
States deals abroad. This guidance should properly have taken
the form of a precise outline of jurisdictional boundaries as
generally accepted by the international community, with the
balancing of interests treated as an abstention consideration
under federal law. The Restatement Third formulation of effects jurisdiction does not accomplish this purpose. Furthermore, by presenting political interest-balancing factors to the
judiciary, the Restatement Third fails to give guidance onjurisdictional limitations where it is most needed: at the lawmaking
stage.
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